IKEv2 can use an AAA server to remotely authenticate mobile and PC users and assign private IP addresses to these users. IKEv2 supports Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication.Only IKEv1 (requiring an encryption card) supports digital envelope authentication (HSS-DE).In contrast, IKEv2 negotiation requires only four (2+2) messages. There are also brute-force attacks targeting at the aggressive mode, such as man-in-the-middle attacks.įor IKEv1 negotiation, its main mode involves nine (6+3) messages, and its aggressive mode involves six (3+3) messages. In this mode, information packets are not encrypted, posing risks of information leakage. The aggressive mode of IKEv1 is not secure.This defect is inherent to IKEv1 and is addressed in IKEv2. After responding to spoofed packets, the responder maintains initiator-responder relationships, consuming a large number of system resources. IKEv1 is vulnerable to DoS amplification attacks and half-open connection attacks.This separation of encryption from data integrity protection prevents the use of authenticated encryption (AES-GCM) with IKEv1. For IKEv1, the E (Encryption) bit in the ISALMP header specifies that the payloads following the ISALMP header are encrypted, but any data integrity verification of those payloads is handled by a separate hash payload. In addition, IKEv1 does not support strong cryptographic algorithms such as AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305. The cryptographic algorithms supported by IKEv1 have not been updated for more than 10 years.
0 kommentar(er)
